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Introduction
In this paper we import a mainstream psycholgical theory, known as attachment theory, into economics and show the implications of this theory for economic behavior by individuals in certain settings. We test these implications by appealing to the much researched Ultimatum Game, and demonstrate the ability of the theory to help explain some of the differing behavior across individuals in this game.
Attachment theory is meant to describe and explain people's enduring patterns of relationships from birth to death. This domain overlaps considerably with that of Interpersonal Theory. Because attachment is thought to have an evolutionary basis, attachment theory is also related to Evolutionary Psychology. Bowlby (1969) , who first applied this idea to the infant-caregiver bond, was inspired by studies from ethology. Ethology is concerned with the adaptive or survival value of behavior and its evolutionary history. It was first applied to research on children in the 1960s, but has become more influential in recent years. Bowlby created an alternative to psychoanalytic theory, one much more solidly grounded in primate ethology, cognitive developmental psychology, and clinical research. Basically, attachment theory is a theory of personality and social behavior.
Today, because of this auspicious theoretical and psychometric foundation, attachment theory has spawned a large and complex literature comprising thousands of empirical studies, a literature that continues to reflect Bowlby's psychoanalytic origins. As a personality theory, attachment theory combines psychoanalytic, evolutionary, developmental, social-cognitive, and trait-like constructs in a systematic framework that transcends the usual typologies of personality theories. Still, the subheadings used in textbooks that systematically compare personality theoriesstructure, motivation, dynamics, individual differences, development, and mental health or optimal adjustment -are useful in organizing and explaining attachment theory and its research literature.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews attachment theory as developed in the psychology literature. Section 2 presents a short exposition of the Ultimatum Game and presents some literature on how personal traits affect behavior in the Ultimatum Game. Section 3 provides the experimental design and the hypotheses. Section 4 contains the results and the analyses. A brief summary and discussion can be found in Section 5.
Introduction to Attachment Theory
Attachment theory was first suggested by Bowlby (1969 Bowlby ( , 1973 Bowlby ( , 1980 Bowlby ( , 1988 to help explain the emotional connection that is formed between infants and their caregivers.
This connection, called attachment style, is credited with assisting the infant's survival during times of stress or threat. Different modes of communication evolve over time to assist in creating this attachment system. According to Bowlby, the attachment system is activated through the answer to the following fundamental question: Is the attachment figure nearby, accessible and attentive? If the child perceives the answer to this question to be "yes," he or she feels loved, secure, and confident, and, behaviorally, is likely to explore his or her environment, play with others, and be sociable. If, however, the child perceives the answer to this question to be "no," the child experiences anxiety, and, behaviorally, is likely to exhibit attachment behaviors ranging from simple visual search to active search expressed by crawling and crying in an attempt to find the attachment figure.
Although Bowlby believed that the basic dynamics described above captured the normative dynamics of the attachment behavioral system, he recognized that there were individual differences in the way children appraised the accessibility of the attachment figure and how they regulated their attachment behavior in response to a threat. However, it wasn't until his colleague, Mary Ainsworth, began to systematically study infant-parent separations that a formal understanding of these individual differences came to fruition. Ainsworth and her students developed a technique called "the stranger situation." In this technique, 12-month-old infants and their parents were brought to the laboratory and were systematically separated (and replaced by a stranger) and reunited. In "the stranger situation," most children (about 60%) behaved in accordance with Bowlby's "normative" theory. They became upset when the parent left the room, but when he or she returned, they actively sought the parent and were easily comforted by him or her. Children who exhibit this pattern of behavior are often called secure. Other children (about 20% or less) are uncomfortable initially (perhaps because of the new surroundings), and, upon separation, become extremely distressed. When reunited with their parents, these children often exhibit conflicting behaviors that suggest that on the one hand they want to be comforted, but on the other hand, they also want to "punish" the parent for leaving. These children are often called anxious-ambivalent. The third pattern of attachment that Ainsworth and her colleagues documented is called avoidant.
Avoidant children (about 20%) don't appear too distressed by the separation, and, upon reunion, avoid seeking contact with their parent, sometimes even turning their attention to play-objects on the floor.
To sum up, at least three types of children exist: those who are secure in their relationship with their parents, those who are anxious-ambivalent, and those who are avoidant. 1 These individual differences are correlated with infant-parent interactions in the home during the first year of life. Children who appear secure in the "stranger situation," for example, tend to have parents who are responsive to their needs.
Children who appear insecure in the stranger situation often have parents who are insensitive to their needs or inconsistent or rejecting in the care they provide.
Although Bowlby primarily focused on understanding the nature of the infantcaregiver relationship, he believed that attachment characterizes human experience in all stages of life. Attachment styles in adults are thought to stem directly from the working models (or mental models) of the self and other, which were developed during infancy and childhood. The dynamics of the attachment system develop during a life span by social interactions with attachment figures, eventually resulting in fairly stable individual differences in mental representations of past attachment experiences (Fraley and Shaver, 2000) . Shaver (1987, 1994) were two of the first researchers to explore Bowlby's ideas in the context of adult romantic relationships. According to Hazan and Shaver, the emotional bond that develops between adult romantic partners is partly a function of the attachment behavioral system that gives rise to the emotional bond between infants and their caregivers. They argue that attachment theory provides not only a framework for understanding emotional reactions in infants, but also a framework for understanding love, loneliness, and social interactions in adults. On the basis of these parallels, Hazan and Shaver argue that during adolescence, a new way of approaching attachment is formed. This new form of attachment is predictive of attachment 1 In several studies, it was noted that many infants did not fall into any of the original three categories previously described. A fourth attachment pattern has been proposed in order to describe infants who displayed a pronounced mixture of ambivalent and avoidant patterns of behavior. This style is the "disorganized" attachment style.
behavior in future life, such as with one's own kids or in marital relationships. It has to be remembered though, that the relationship between parents and children does not become less important during adolescence; the adolescent just becomes less dependent on the parents.
Hazan and Shaver (1987) designed a self report questionnaire composed of questions relating to interpersonal beliefs and expectations from attachment figures.
Respondants were asked to choose which interpersonal expectation best fit their own interpersonal relationships. The "secure" person was described as someone who develops close relationships relatively easily, is comfortable with the mutual dependence that accompanies such a relationship, is not anxious about separation or abandonment and tends to be more satisfied in his relationships than insecure adults.
The "avoidant" person was described as someone who feels discomfort when close to someone, has trouble trusting that person, and has a feeling that others have more interesting and intimate relationships than he has. The "anxious-ambivalent" person was described as someone with fears of abandonment or of not being loved, while at the same time having an urge to develop a tight relationship with their significant other.
Initially, adult attachment research was based on Ainsworth et al.'s (1978) three category typology of attachment styles in infancy -secure, anxious and avoidantand Hazan and Shaver's (1987) conceptualization of similar adult styles in the domain of romantic relationships. Subsequent studies (e.g., Bartholomew and Horowitz, 1991; Brennan et al., 1998) indicated that attachment styles are more appropriately conceptualized as regions in a continuous two-dimensional space (Figure 1 ).
One dimension has been labeled attachment anxiety. People who score high in this dimension tend to worry whether their partner is available, responsive and attentive.
People who score in the low range of this dimension are more secure in the responsiveness of their partners. The other dimension is called attachment avoidance.
People on the high end of this dimension prefer not to rely on others or open up to others. They strive to maintain behavioral independence and emotional distance from partners. People on the low end of this dimension are more comfortable being intimate with others and are more secure depending upon others and being depended upon. A prototypical secure adult is low on both of these dimensions.
These dimensions create a space within which an individual's attachment tendency can be represented. In the secure region both anxiety and avoidance are low. In the preoccupied region (referred to later on as the "anxious" region) anxiety is high and avoidance is low. In the avoidance region, obviously, avoidance is high.
The use of attachment theory allows us to define a different framework for understanding certain aspects of individual behavior. In this paper we use attachment theory to examine the connection between attachment types and economic decision making in the Ultimatum Game.
The Ultimatum Game
The Ultimatum Game is one of the most extensively studied games in experimental labs. This is a two-player bargaining game: the first player (the proposer) makes a proposal of how to divide a certain sum of money with another player, who has the option to accept or reject the proposed division. If the second player (the responder) accepts the offer, each player gets his agreed share of the pie. If the responder rejects the offer, each player earns zero.
In this paper, we use attachment theory to tackle the questions of why proposers offer high shares of their endowment and why responders reject a substantial proportion of the offers. The Ultimatum Game naturally involves situations of negative and positive reciprocity, and of certainty and uncertainty, all crucial variables in attachment theory.
In much of the literature, the behavior of subjects in the Ultimatum Game is partially explained by social preferences or other regarding behavior. In this work, we extend this trend, and show that an individual's attachment style can be instructive in understanding his behavior in the Ultimatum Game.
Classifying the players according to their attachment types, we find that insecure types react in different ways to the game. As proposers, anxiously attached individuals send a high proportion of their endowment, while avoidant individuals send a low proportion, i.e., we find a positive correlation between offer and anxiety, and a negative correlation between avoidance and offer. Analyzing the behavior of the responders, we found a positive correlation between anxiety and the acceptance rate, and a negative, but not statistically significant, relationship between avoidance and the acceptance rate.
Relevant Literature Review
The Ultimatum Game was initially presented in Güth et al. (1982) . Assuming players' utility is monotonically increasing in their monetary payoffs and that they care about their own payoffs and not those of their opponents, game theory predicts that proposers should offer zero or the smallest non-zero amount possible, and responders should accept (if the offer is zero, the responder should be indifferent between accepting and rejecting). The data are inconsistent with both of these predictions;
proposers tend to offer amounts higher than the minimum, and responders tend to reject if offered a relatively small share. In their experiment, Güth et al. (1982) find that for both experienced and inexperienced players the mean offer was about 37% of the "pie," which is significantly more than the epsilon predicted by the subgame perfect equilibrium, and low offers were often rejected. In the replication, after a week to think about it, first players' offers decreased (the mean offer was 32%), but still were significantly higher than epsilon. As a result, there was an even higher rate of rejection by the responders, (but higher payoffs to the proposers whose low offers were accepted by responders). While for proposers such behavior can be "rationally" In a pioneering study, Roth et al. (1991) suggested that cultural differences could affect the way in which the game is played, and proceeded to run the Ultimatum Game in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo, being careful to keep things as similar as possible in all locations. They show that the distribution of offers was significantly different in different countries. In the U.S. and Slovenia, the modal offer in the tenth round remained 500 tokens (50%), as in the first round. In Japan, the most frequent offers at the tenth round were between 400 tokens and 450 tokens. In Israel, they were 400 tokens. Henrich et al. (2001) conducted the experiment in small communities in 15 developing countries, and found even more variation in behavior, however, the variation was according to societal characteristics, e.g., the degree of market integration or cooperation, and not according to measurable individual socioeconomic characteristics. Oosterbeek et al. (2004) conducted a meta-analysis of 37 papers covering ultimatum experiments in 25 different countries, and used measures of cultural traits to explain the differences across countries. These studies demonstrated convincingly that one should not expect identical behavior from people with different cultures. They did not, however, differentiate between people with the same culture. Eckel and Grossman (2001) were the first to investigate whether gender affects play in this game. They found that women offer slightly more than men on average although the differences were only marginally significant, and are significantly more likely to accept unequal splits. An additional important finding is that women are perceived to be more egalitarian than men. For a survey of research on gender differences and consequences of the perceived differences, see Eckel et al. (2008) .
More in line with our research, Meyer (1992) and Carpenter et al. (2005) included a personality scale known as the Mach (Machiavelli) Scale as an explanatory variable in the Ultimatum Game. Construction of the Mach Scale is accomplished by posing 20 statements with which the subject is asked to agree or disagree on a seven-point scale.
The Mach Scale is meant to capture a person's level of cynicism about others, willingness to engage in manipulative behavior and concern about morality. Meyer (1992) found that those with high Machs are less likely to reject low offers. Carpenter et al. (2005) found no evidence that the Mach Score has an effect on offers (although it does have an effect on offers in the Dictator Game). the effect on rejection rates (there were only 4 rejections in 47 observations), but they do find an effect of certain traits on offers. Specifically, they show that people who are both extroverts and feeling (as opposed to thinking) types make higher offers.
Experimental Design and Hypotheses
We ran a standard Ultimatum Game experiment consisting of 4 sessions of 10 periods each, conducted in a computer laboratory in Bar-Ilan University. Eighty four undergraduate economics students participated, with each session lasting about 45 minutes. Before the beginning of the session subjects were given the instructions of the game, and asked to fill out a questionnaire that verified that they understood the instructions. Subjects' roles (proposer or responder) were determined randomly before the first round of play and remained constant through all rounds. Players were matched randomly and then rematched randomly after each round in order to preserve the one-shot property of the Ultimatum Game. All participants received a 20 NIS (New Israeli Shekels, approximately $5, close to the hourly minimum wage) show-up fee and, in addition, the proposers received 50 NIS which they could allocate as they saw fit between them and the responders. After each round of play, subjects were informed of the outcome. Subjects were given record sheets on which they could record their outcomes. At the end of the experiment, one of the rounds was chosen randomly, and the payment to the subjects was determined based on their performance in this round. While the payoffs were calculated and prepared (paid in cash), the subjects filled out an ECR questionnaire, a 36-item self report attachment measure developed by Brennan et al. (replicated in the Appendix). The levels of avoidance and anxiety were measured from this questionnaire; avoidance is calculated as the average of the answers to the odd-numbered questions on the ECR questionnaire, and anxiety is measured as the average of the answers to the even questions on the ECR questionnaire. Explanation of Hypotheses 3 and 4: Individuals who score high on attachment avoidance activate distancing and self-reliance strategies. The main purpose of these subjects is not to activate their attachment system in order not to feel that they are being exploited and used, feelings that lead to frustration. High offers create dependency on the behavior of the responder that may bear an emotional toll in case of a rejection. Avoidant individuals perceive rejection of high offers as a rejection of themselves. In contrast, low offers do not put the proposer in such a vulnerable position, because they can explain the rejection as resulting from the low offer. By making low offers, they protect themselves from getting hurt. They activate distancing strategies in order to prevent a situation where they are dependent on someone else, the Ultimatum Game being a good example. Proposers who scored high on attachment avoidance are expected to offer lower shares of the total amount:
higher shares might make them feel gullible and exposed to interactions with the responder. Responders who score high on attachment avoidance are expected to reject higher offers, again in order not to feel gullible.
It is important to stress that the anonymous setting works against us finding the stated effects. Attachment theory deals with situations in which people are in close contact with one another. We are extending the theory to include situations of anonymity, and we fully expect that any findings would be strengthened in a non-anonymous setting.
Results

Non-Parametric Tests
We first present the results in general and then test the relevance of attachment type for behavior. Referring back to Figure 1 , it is appealing (but problematic, as explained below) to divide subjects along each of the axes separately -according to avoidance and according to anxiety. To this end, we divide the population (first proposers, then responders) into two equal sized groups -those whose index place them below the median and those who are above the median -first for anxiety and then for avoidance.
Of course, there is nothing particularly relevant about the median -Bowlby's theory says that there are different attachment styles, but does not say where to draw the line, and does not predict an equal number of people in each group. Behavior of proposers are presented in Figure 4 and rejection rates for responders are presented in Figure 5 . A Mann-Whitney test and an Epps-Singleton test both show that there is no discernable difference (Hypothesis 1) between high anxiety and low anxiety proposers. Responder behavior (Hypothesis 2) is more difficult to assess since the offers faced by the individuals are not identical. Nevertheless, we see high anxiety people accepting lower offers, although the difference may not be significant. All told, low anxiety people rejected 52 of 210 proposals, and high anxiety individuals rejected "only" 41 of the 210 proposals. The problem with these tests is that they are one-dimensional; they do not take into account that the fundamental nature of attachment theory is two-dimensional. In fact, looking at avoidance or anxiety alone can be misleading, since someone may easily have any combination of high/low avoidance and high/low anxiety, as depicted in Figure 1 . In our experiment, for instance, the correlation between anxiety and avoidance among our 84 participants was only 0.11. Thus, we want to strengthen our comparison by considering those who are relatively low in anxiety but high in avoidance (whom we label dismissing avoidant) and are thus expected to give little and reject much, with those who are relatively high in anxiety but low in avoidance (whom we label preoccupied), from whom we expect the diametric opposite. For this comparison we retained only those who were above the median for one and below the median for the other, and discarded all those who were either above the median in both or below the median in both. Among the responders there were ten preoccupied individuals and ten who were dismissing avoidant. As seen in Figure 9 , the dismissing avoidant individuals were far more likely to reject low offers than were the preoccupied ones. In fact, of the 100 offers in each group, there were 24 rejections in the first group and only 13 in the second.
Regression Analysis
Since there are two dimensions to attachment theory, it becomes natural to use regression analysis to separate the effects and test for their significance. To this extent, we ran OLS regressions to examine proposer behavior, and Logit regressions to examine responder behavior. The central explanatory variables are Anxiety and Avoidance, both continuous variables between 1 and 7.
The fact that we have ten rounds of data for each individual raises some econometric issues. Since our explanatory variables include individual specific measures, we cannot use fixed effect or random effect variables to capture any missing variables at the individual level, since these variables would be perfectly correlated with the explanatory variables. Running a regression including all the data therefore leads to a situation in which observations are not independent. This issue is discussed at length in Botelho, et al. (2005) , where a number of solutions are suggested which we adopt. First, we assume simply that there are no missing explanatory variables and thus no problem, and use all the data in our regression. For proposers, for whom the measures of anxiety and avoidance are the only explanatory variables, this yields the same point estimates (but smaller standard errors) as using the average offer (this will not be true for responders, as presented below), and we therefore do not present this regression. Instead, we present the regression in which we use all the data and include fixed effects for each round rather than for each individual. This is appropriate if there is some type of round effect, such as learning.
We also present the results of running the regression with a single observation per individual. We present the results when we use both the average proposal, and the results in the first round. In this manner observations are independent, but many data points are lost (90%). Finally, we run a Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE), which estimates the effects of variables that have no intra-panel variation, and uses population-averaged estimation methods. Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level. **Significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. ***Significantly different from 0 at the 1% level.
The results for proposers are presented in Table 1 , and are quite similar across specifications. The size of the offer by the proposer is greater the more anxious and less avoidant he is. This result is consistent with the Hypotheses 1 and 3 above. Note that using the average offer must yield the same coefficients for anxiety and avoidance as running the regression on all the data with fixed effects. We include both simply because the standard errors differ. With respect to the fixed effects, the category left out was the first round. None of the fixed effects were significantly different from zero (i.e., no round was significantly different from round 1), though they are almost all negative, and, in fact, the average offer in the first round was higher than in most other rounds. It is interesting to note that the coefficient on avoidance is not significant in the first period, although the point estimate is almost exactly the same as in later rounds.
When considering the behavior of responders, an additional coefficient is requiredthe amount offered. Because of this we cannot use an average over all rounds, and we are still unable to include specific or random effects into the model for the reason raised above. In addition, there is little to be learned from looking at the first round alone since there were only three rejections in the first round (an offer of 5 and two offers of 10). We do include specific effects for round number. Since the dependent variable is binary (accept=1, reject=0), we use a logit regression specification. The results are presented in Table 2 . Naturally, the most important explanatory variable is the amount offered -the more offered the higher the probability of acceptance. As per Hypothesis 2, higher anxiety individuals are more ready to accept low offers. Hypothesis 4, however, is not supported by the data; while the coefficient is of the right sign, it is not significantly different from 0. Interestingly, all of the round coefficients are negative and almost all are significant, i.e., the likelihood of rejection in the first round was higher than in later rounds. This seems to stem from two factors -first, as stated above, offers were higher in the first period than in later periods. Second, some very low bids were accepted in the first period but rejected later on (an offer of 0, two offers of 5 and four offers of 10 were all accepted in period 1).
Attachment Style and Optimal Proposals
As shown in Roth, et al. (1991) , given the behavior of responders, the optimal offer by proposers (the offer that maximizes the expected return) is well above zero, and, in fact, proposers (on average) behave optimally. In this section we will show that optimal proposer behavior depends on whom you are facing, and that if you know the attachment type of the person with whom you are dealing you can benefit by taking this information into account. This type of information could be quite useful in, say, negotiations (see, for instance, Eckel and Grossman, 2001 ).
Following Roth et al. (1991) , we examined what offers maximize the expected return for the proposers according to attachment type. To this end, we use the first specification in Table 2 to calculate the expected acceptance rate from each offer for each group as a function of the levels of anxiety and avoidance, and multiply this by the amount retained by the proposer to calculate the expected return from an offer.
We then show how this expected return is affected by attachment type. In Figure 10 we take this comparison to the extreme by comparing persons with anxiety levels of 1 and 7 and attachment levels of 1 and 7. The results are shown in Figure 10 . As seen, the optimal offer depends on whom you are facing. The top half of Table 3 presents the optimal offers and the expected income from that offer. In Figure 11 we do a similar comparison for our population (see also the bottom half of Table 3) , where, as before, we divide the subjects into four groups -above and below each of the medians of anxiety and avoidance. We use the average levels of anxiety and avoidance in each of the groups to again calculate the optimal offers and the expected incomes, and find that the order is unchanged, but the differences are significantly reduced when compared with extreme values. As discussed above, the groups we take are not indicative of Bowlby's actual categorization; but, it does allow comparison between different segments of our subject base.
Discussion
In this paper we considered the effect of the attachment style on individual economic behavior in the context of the Ultimatum Game. A number of significant effects of attachment style on behavior were uncovered.
We found that if the proposers are anxiously attached, they offer higher shares of their endowment. As established by the psychological literature, the main goal of anxiously attached individuals is to get proximity and to be loved and appreciated. Therefore, as expected, anxiously attached proposers offer high shares to responders. In addition since the desire of anxiously attached individuals is to be loved and appreciated, they are very sensitive to "anti-goal" states (a situation that creates distress, such as being abandoned by a loved one). Since the game contains uncertainty, that is, the proposer does not know whether his offer will be accepted or not, they will offer high shares of their endowment in order to avoid an anti-goal state of a rejection of their offer. As for anxiously attached responders, they show a tendency to accept more offers, again, in order to be appreciated.
As for avoidant players, as proposers their offers were low, as expected. The main purpose of subjects who score high in avoidance is not to activate their attachment system in order not to feel that they are being exploited and used, feelings that lead to frustration. High offers create dependency on the behavior of the responder that may bear an emotional toll in case of a rejection. Avoidant individuals perceive rejection of high offers as a rejection of themselves. In contrast, low offers do not put the proposer in such a vulnerable position, because they can explain the rejection as resulting from the low offer. By making low offers, they protect themselves from getting hurt. The same is expected of avoidant responders, and while such a direction is observed, it was not found to be statistically significant.
As discussed above, the essence of attachment theory deals with situations in which the parties are in close contact with one another. Thus, the anonymous setting in which Ultimatum Games are carried out works heavily against our hypotheses, and any findings should be viewed as lower bounds on expected effects in real-life settings. Clearly, if correct, our results suggest that knowledge of these behavioral implications could be useful in many strategic settings, particularly when one is able to discern the type of individual with whom one is dealing (as is the case when dealing with someone with whom you are close). We believe that attachment styles can predict behavior in other experimental, as well as real-world, settings. We leave it to future research to see if this is indeed the case. The following statements concern how you generally feel in close relationships (e.g., with romantic partners, close friends, or family members). Respond to each statement by indicating how much you agree or disagree with it. Write the number in the space provided, using the following rating scale: 
Appendix: Experiments in Close Relationships
